Theories of modernization and the framework of multiple modernities

The major approach to the study of modernity and modernization presented here goes against some of the explicit and implicit assumptions of the classical sociological tradition and above all of the theories of modernization predominant in the 1950s and 1960s as well as against some of the themes dominant in contemporary discourse.

The ‘classical’ theories of modernization from the 1950s identified the core characteristics of modern society as the decomposition of older ‘closed’ institutional frameworks and the development of new structural, institutional and cultural features and formations, and the growing potential for social mobilization (Deutsch, 1961). The most important structural dimension of modernity was seen in the tendency to structural differentiation – manifest among others in growing urbanization; commodification of the economy; the development of distinctive channels of communication and agencies of education. On the institutional level such decomposition gave rise to the development of new institutional formations, such as the modern state, modern national collectivities, new market, especially capitalist, economies, which were defined as autonomous, and which were regulated by specific mechanisms of the market; of bureaucratic organizations and the like. In later formulations the development of such autonomous spheres, each regulated by its own logic was often defined as the essence of modern institutional formations. Concomitantly modernity was seen as bearing a distinct cultural program, and shaping a distinct type of personality.

These theories, like the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim and at least one reading of Weber (Durkheim, 1973; Kamenka, 1983; cf. Weber, 1978, 1968a, 1968b) implicitly or explicitly conflated major dimensions of modernity as they saw it developing in the West. In these approaches, analytically distinct dimensions combine and become historically inseparable. An often implicit assumption of modernization studies was that cultural dimensions of modernization, the ‘secular’ rational worldview including an individualistic orientation, are necessarily interwoven with the structural ones. Most of the classics of sociology as well as studies of modernization of the 1940s and 1950s and the closely related studies of
convergence of industrial societies have assumed that the basic institutional formations that developed in European modernity, and the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West with its hegemonic and homogenizing tendencies, will ‘naturally’ be taken over, with possible local variations, in all – or at least in the ‘successful’ – modernizing societies, and that this project of modernity will continue in the West, and will ultimately prevail throughout the world.

But the reality that emerged proved to be radically different. Developments in the contemporary era did not bear out the assumption of ‘convergence’ of modern societies. They actually indicated that the various modern autonomous institutional arenas – the economic, the political, the educational or the family are defined and regulated and combine in different ways in different societies and in different periods of their development. The great diversity of modern societies, even of societies relatively similar in their economic development, like the major industrial capitalist societies in Europe, the USA and Japan, became more apparent. Far-reaching variability developed even within the West, within Europe itself, and above all between Europe and the Americas – the USA (Sombart, 1976), Latin America, or rather the Latin Americas. This was even more evident with respect to the cultural and structural dimensions of modernity. While the different dimensions of the original Western project constituted crucial reference points for tracing the processes of continual expansion of modernity, the developments in these societies have gone far beyond the original cultural program of modernity; and far beyond many of the initial premises of this project, as well as beyond the institutional patterns that developed in Europe.

Contrary to the claims of many scholars from the 1970s on that the best way to understand the dynamics of different ‘modernizing’ societies is to see them as continuations of their traditional institutional patterns and dynamics, the institutional formations which developed in most societies of the world have been distinctively modern, even if their dynamics were influenced by distinctive cultural premises, traditions and historical experiences. Of special importance in this context was the fact that the most important social and political movements which became predominant in these societies were basically modern, promulgating distinctive ways of interpreting modernity. This was true not only of the various reformist, socialist and nationalist movements which came into being in all these societies from about the middle of the 19th century up to and after the Second World War, but also of contemporary fundamentalist movements.

From the outset, in attempts in modern societies to understand the nature of this new era or civilization, there developed two opposing evaluations, attesting indeed to the inherent contradictions of modernity. One such evaluation, implicit in theories of modernization and of the ‘convergence of industrial societies’ of the 1950s and the 1960s, saw modernity as a progressive force which promises a better, inclusive, emancipating world. The other such evaluation, which developed first within European societies and later resonated in non-Western European societies, espoused a highly ambivalent approach to modernity – seeing technology, or the empowerment of egoistic and hedonistic attitudes and goals as a morally destructive force.

The classics of sociology, de Tocqueville, Marx, Weber and Durkheim, were already highly conscious that modernity was full of such contradictory – constructive and destructive – forces. Such ambivalence intensified in the 1920s and 1930s with the rise of fascism and communism, the confrontation with which constituted one of the major concerns of European sociology in that period, above all in the Frankfurt School of the so-called ‘critical’ sociology. Paradoxically, after the Second World War, a new optimistic view of modernity with but weak emphasis on its contradictions prevailed, both in the ‘liberal’ pluralistic, and the Marxist, especially the communist versions. But such an optimistic view of modernity gave way to a more pessimistic one with the intellectual rebellion and protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the waning of the Cold War and with the rise of ‘postmodernity’. The critical themes and the ambivalent attitude to modernity re-emerged, emphasizing again the menacing aspects of the development of technology and science such as the nuclear threat and the destruction of the environment (Eisenstadt, 1973). Awareness of the destructive potential of modernity was reinforced by the recognition that the continual expansion of modernity throughout the world was not necessarily benign or peaceful; that it did not assure the continual progress of reason. The fact that these processes were continuously interwoven with wars, with imperialistic political constitutional and economic expansion, with violence, genocides, repression and the dislocation of large populations – indeed sometimes of entire societies – was recognized. In the optimistic view of modernity, such phenomena were often portrayed as ‘survivals’ of pre-modern attitudes. Increasingly, however, it was recognized that the ‘old’ destructive forces were radically transformed and intensified by being interwoven with the ideological premises of modernity, with its expansion, and with the specific patterns in the institutionalization of modern regimes. This
generated a specifically modern barbarism. The most important manifestation of such a transformation was the ideologization of violence, terror and war, which became central to the constitution of the modern European state system, and of the nation-states as well as of the European imperialism often legitimised in terms of some components of the cultural programs of modernity. The Holocaust became a symbol of the negative, destructive potentialities of modernity, of the barbarism lurking within the very core of modernity.

**Modernity as a distinct civilization – the cultural program of modernity**

Modernity has indeed expanded to most of the world and given rise to civilizational patterns which share some central core characteristics, but which unfold differently even if with cognate ideological and institutional dynamics. Moreover, far-reaching changes, beyond the original premises of modernity, have also been taking place in Western societies.

Modernity crystallized into distinct institutional formations – the modern capitalist systems and the modern state spheres system which developed in tandem with the establishment of new hegemonies and counter-hegemonies with processes of dislocation and construction. They developed first of all in Europe and then became exacerbated with the imperial, colonial, economic and political expansion. These continually changing structural and institutional dimensions of modernity were interwoven with the cultural program of modernity, giving rise to multiple modernities.

The interpretation of modernity, of the development of modern societies, and of the contemporary scene in terms of ‘multiple modernities’ entails a shift in the conception of modernity as a new type of civilization – not unlike the formation and expansion of the Great Religions. According to this view, the core of modernity is the crystallization of a mode or modes of interpretation of the world, of a distinct social ‘imaginaire’ (Castoriadis, 1987), an ontological vision or a set of epistemological presuppositions (Wittrock, 2002) – or, in other words, of a distinct cultural program, combined with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations with a central core of unprecedented ‘openness’ and uncertainty. The combination of such institutional formations constituted the core of modernity which generated tensions and dynamics.

The cultural and political program of modernity entailed a shift in the conception of human agency, of autonomy, and of the place of the individual in the flow of time. First of all, the premises and legitimation of the social, ontological and political order were no longer taken for granted. Second, the core of this program was the ‘naturalization’ of cosmos, man and society and a quest for emancipation from the fetters of ‘external’ authority or tradition. Third, central to this cultural program was the assumption that this order can – and is – being constituted by conscious human activities – and hence that it entails the possibility, even perhaps the certainty, of its continual transformability.

The central core of this cultural program has been formulated most succinctly by Weber. According to Faubion (1993: 113–15), ‘[W]eber finds the existential threshold of modernity in a certain deconstruction: of what he speaks of as the “ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented cosmos” … [H]e asserts that] one or another modernity can emerge only as the legitimacy of the postulated cosmos ceases to be taken for granted and beyond reproach. … One can extract two theses: … Modernities in all their variety are responses to the same existential problematic. … [T]hey are precisely those responses that leave the problematic in question intact, that formulate visions of life and practice neither beyond nor in denial of it but rather within it, even in deference to it. …’

A central characteristic of the modern program is manifest in the fact that within it an intensive reflexivity has developed around the basic ontological premises as well as around the bases of the social and political order of authority in society – a reflexivity which was shared even by the most radical critics, who in principle denied its legitimacy. The modern program focused not only on the possibility of different interpretations of the transcendental visions and basic ontological conceptions prevalent in societies, but questioned the taken-for-granted nature of such visions and of the institutional patterns related to them and of the institutional order (Lefort, 1988). It gave rise to an awareness of the multiplicity of such visions and of the possibility that such conceptions can indeed be contested – and continually reconstituted. Such reflexivity was reinforced by the emphasis on novelty, and on a break with the past. This reflexivity also entailed a conception of the future of open possibilities, in which the social and political order can continually be transformed by autonomous human agency.

All these developments entailed, to follow Lefort’s (1988) formulation, the ‘loss’ of markers of certainty with respect to the ontological and the institutional orders alike, giving rise to contestations around the constitution of the major dimensions of the social order.

Such awareness was closely connected with two
central components of the modern project, emphasized in early studies of modernization by Lerner (1958) and later by Inkeles and Smith (1974). First is recognition of the possibility of undertaking a great variety of roles beyond any fixed ascriptive roles, and the receptivity to messages of such open possibilities. Second is recognition of the possibility of belonging to trans-local, changing communities.

These contestations were most fully played out in the political arena, and the ways in which they were played out were shaped first by the tendency to restructure center–periphery relations as the focus of political dynamics in modern societies; second, by the openness of political contestation; third, by the tendency toward politicization of the demands of various sectors of society and of conflicts between them; and fourth, by the struggle about the definition of the realm of the political, and of the distinction between public and private spheres, all of them entailing the loss of markers of certainty.

The other side of this ontological doubt, the loss of the markers of certainty, was the quest to overcome it. This quest was closely connected with the other components of the cultural program of modernity, namely those of the naturalization of the cosmos, of nature and of humankind, and of human emancipation and autonomy (Blumberg, 1987). The autonomy of man – his or hers – but in the first formulation of this program certainly `his` – comprised several components: (1) reflexivity and exploration; (2) active construction of nature and its modernity, possibly including human nature, and of society. The naturalization of humankind and the cosmos as it initially developed in Europe entailed several conflicting premises: first, the change of the place of God in the constitution of the cosmos and of humankind; second the autonomy and potential supremacy of reason in the exploration and even in the shaping of the world. Humanity and nature were increasingly perceived not as directly regulated by the will of God, as in the monotheistic civilizations, or by some higher, transcendental metaphysical principles, as in Hinduism and Confucianism, or by the universal logos, as in the Greek tradition. Rather they were conceived as autonomous entities regulated by internal laws that could be fully explored and grasped by human reason, through human rational inquiry. Thus the rational exploration of `natural` laws became a major focus of the new cultural program. It was assumed that exploration of these laws would lead to the unraveling of the mysteries of the universe and of human destiny, and thus that reason would become the guiding force in the interpretation of the world and in shaping human destiny. For many, scientific exploration became the epitome of rationalism.

Yet in this program there also developed a contradictory tendency – namely a belief in the possibility of bridging the gap between the transcendental and the mundane orders, of realizing in the mundane order some utopian, eschatological visions. Such exploration was not purely passive or contemplative. This modern cultural vision also assumed that such exploration would achieve not only the understanding, but even the mastery of the universe and of human destiny.

The `rational` exploration of nature and the search for potential mastery over it extended beyond the technical and scientific spheres to that of the social, giving rise to the assumption that the application of knowledge acquired in such inquiries was relevant to the management of the affairs of society and to the construction of the socio-political order.

Two complementary but also potentially contradictory tendencies about the best ways in which such construction could take place developed within this program. One was a `totalizing` tendency that gave rise to the belief in the possibility of realizing utopian eschatological visions through conscious human actions in the mundane orders of social life and/or technocratic planning and activities. The totalizing version of this tendency assumed that those who mastered the secrets of nature and of human nature could devise appropriate institutional arrangements for the implementation of the good society. The second major tendency was rooted in a growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests and of multiple interpretations of the common good.

The loss of markers of certainty and the contestations about major dimensions of the social order were exacerbated in the discourse of modernity by the fact that the opening up of numerous institutional and cultural possibilities was connected with the dissolution of hitherto existing social bonds, giving rise to the feeling of uprootedness. `Modernity paints us all into a morass of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish, a universe in which `all that is solid melts into air`" (Berman, 1988). The continuous prevalence of these tensions and the continuous change inherent in modernity has added another crucial dimension to the repertoire of themes in the self-understanding of modern society, namely the perennial awareness of ambivalence inherent to the very program of modernity. This ambivalence is manifest in the fact that all programs of modernity entailed a ‘double’ orientation (Miller, 1997): an affirmation of existing hegemonic arrangements and an attempt to find spaces in which a private or communal orientation can be instituted – indeed of stimulating alternative modernities. Modernity was
perceived to be on ‘endless trial’ (Kolakowski, 1990).

The combination of these components of the new ontological vision led to what Wittrock (2002) and others have designated as the great promissory themes of modernity – the view of modernity as bearing within itself the continual progress of knowledge and of its rational application; of human emancipation, of continual inclusion of sectors of society within its frameworks and of the expansion of such emancipatory forces to entire humanity. But it was also this combination that bore within itself the seeds of the possibility of the great disappointments and traumas attendant on the attempts to realize these promises with modernity beset by internal antinomies and contradictions, continual critical discourse and political contestations.

The promissory notes of modernity and the antinomies and tensions in the cultural and political programs of modernity

The basic antinomies of modernity constituted a radical transformation of those inherent in the Axial civilizations. Those focused first on the awareness of a great range of possibilities of transcendental visions and of the range of ways of their possible implementation; second, they focused on the tension between reason and revelation or faith; and third, on the problematic of the desirability of attempts at the full institutionalization of these visions in their pristine form (Arnason et al., 2005; Tiryakian, 1996).

The transformation of these antinomies in the cultural program of modernity focused first on the evaluation of major dimensions of human experience, and especially on the place of reason in the construction of nature, of human society and human history; second, on the concomitant problem of the bases of morality and autonomy; third, on the tension between reflexivity and the active construction of nature and society; fourth, on that between totalizing and pluralistic approaches to human life and the constitution of society; and fifth, on that between control and autonomy, or discipline and freedom.

The first major tension that developed within the cultural program of modernity was that with respect to the primacy of different dimensions of human existence, especially the tension between the predominance of reason as against the emotional and aesthetic dimensions. Closely related were tensions between different conceptions of the bases of human morality, especially whether such morality could be based on or grounded in universal principles of reason, in instrumental rationality or in multiple rationalities; and/or in multiple concrete experiences and traditions of different human communities.

The second tension that developed within the cultural program of modernity was that between different conceptions of human autonomy and its relation to the constitution of humankind, society and nature, especially between reflexivity and critical exploration on the one hand, and on the other on the mastery, even the constitution of nature and society.

Closely related is the tension between the emphasis on human autonomy and the extensive restrictions (Elias, 1983; Foucault, 1965, 1973, 1975, 1988) rooted in the institutionalization of this program, especially its technocratic and/or moral visionary totalizing conceptions, i.e. between freedom and control (Wagner, 1994).

Perhaps the most critical tension, in ideological and political terms alike, has been that between the pluralistic view which accepts the existence of different values and rationalities as against the view which conflates such different values and above all different rationalities in a totalistic way. This tension has probably been the most critical from the point of view of the development of the different cultural and institutional patterns of modernity, and of its destructive potentialities.

Additional tensions emphasized strongly by Weber were those focusing on the contradiction between the basic premises and antinomies of the cultural and political programs of modernity and the institutional developments of modern societies (cf. Mitzman, 1969); the vicissitudes of the institutional order of this program. Their central focus was the exclusivist tendencies rooted both in the ontological premises of this program as well as its institutionalization. These entailed the continual dislocation and exclusion of various social sectors and collectivities from active participation in this order with claims to a universal emancipatory vision for the entire human race. Of special importance among these contradictions have been those between creative dimensions inherent in the visions which led to the crystallization of modernity (the visions promulgated in the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and the Revolutions) and the flattening of these visions, the ‘disenchantment’ of the world inherent in their routinization, in the growing bureaucratization of the modern world.

These contradictions were intensified by the tension between the tendency to self-definition and constitution of autonomous political units, states and nation-states and the often intertwined development of local and transnational groups, networks and social spaces beyond their control.

It was around these tensions that there developed
the different major criticisms of modernity. The most radical criticisms of modernity denied the premises of the cultural program of modernity especially in regard to the autonomy of individuals and the supremacy of reason. They denied that these premises could be seen as grounded in any transcendental vision, and that they could be marked as the epitome of human creativity. Such criticisms claimed that these premises denied human creativity giving rise to the flattening of human experience and the erosion of moral order; and to the alienation of man from nature and from society (Eisenstadt, 1992, 1999a).

These radical criticisms could be undertaken from two opposite, sometimes curiously complementary, points of view: first a religious view, which espoused the primacy of tradition and religious authority emphasizing that only religious orientations assure the validity of transcendental visions and second, an ‘expressivist’ emphasis which denied the primacy of reason as against the autonomy of human will and creativity. In its most radical versions, such criticisms would attempt to go beyond the cultural program of modernity by absolutizing one of its components (see Wittgenstein, in Von Savigny, 2001; Heidegger, in Sheehan, 1998).

These extreme criticisms of modernity, especially those which denied the legitimacy of modernity in its own terms, gave rise to the quest for total revolution as a central component of the discourse of modernity. These longings were reinforced by an emphasis on the novelty of the modern program and its break with the past (Yack, 1986) – even if for the most part, the gnostic eschatological orientation in the programs of modernity had its roots in Christian religious tradition.

The major themes of the critical discourse of modernity were fully articulated in the arts, in literature, in philosophical discourse and in ‘popular’ culture. But beyond these tensions and contradictions, the various contestations around the different interpretations of modernity were articulated in modern societies and by new social, ethnic, national and religious social movements which changed in different periods of modernity – but which constitute a central component of the modern scene. Continually interwoven with the developments in the major institutional arenas in the political, the economic and the educational systems and in systems of communications was a constitution of new collectivities. There developed continuous confrontations between the claims of the cultural program of modernity to some overreaching vision through which the modern world becomes meaningful and the fragmentation of such meaning, and the attempts and struggles of these sectors to be incorporated in broader frameworks and centers.

The expansion of modernity and the development of international systems and of multiple modernities

The tensions inherent in the cultural and political programs of modernity were closely interwoven with the expansion of modernity from Western to Central and Eastern Europe, to the Americas and then to Asia and Africa, leading to the development of closely interwoven international, ultimately worldwide but yet distinct institutional economic, political and symbolic frameworks and systems, among the worldwide institutional, cultural and ideological frameworks and systems each of which was based on some of the premises of modern civilization, and each was rooted in some basic institutional dimension (Tiryakian, 1985; Wallerstein, 1974). The expansion of modernity, not unlike that of the Great Religions or of great Imperial regimes in the past, undermined the symbolic and institutional premises of many societies, causing intensive dislocations while opening new possibilities. The combination of military, political and economic expansion with ideological visions rooted in distinct cultural programs has been characteristic of all Great Religions of the Axial Civilizations – to some extent of the Jewish, certainly of the Christian, Islamic or Confucian and to some extent also of Buddhism, as well as of the Hellenistic and Roman Empires. What was new in the modern era was the intensity of multi-centered and heterogeneous technological advances, the dynamics of modern economic and political forces, the changes and developments attendant on them and their impact on the multiple dislocations of social sectors.

Of crucial importance in this context is the fact that its basic features crystallized out of the dynamics of Western and European Christian civilization and societies, and that the expansion of modernity entailed its continual impingement on other civilizations, among them the major Axial Civilizations, generating continual confrontations between their premises and those of European modernity.

Out of the continual interaction between the processes of change in the economic, technological, political and cultural arenas and the attempts to institutionalize the cultural and political program of modernity with its tensions and contradictions, there developed in the various historical contexts a great variety of modern or modernizing societies, sharing many common characteristics but also evincing great
differences among themselves, i.e. a great variety of multiple modernities, epitomizing different interpretations of the cultural and political program of modernity (Eisenstadt, 2002).

Differences between the different cultural programs of modernity were closely related to the vicissitudes of their institutionalization. Thus, in the political realm, they were closely related to the tension between the utopian and the civil components in the construction of modern politics; between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘normal’ politics, or between the general will and the will of all; between civil society and the state, between the individual and the collectivity. These different interpretations of cultural programs of modernity entailed also different conceptions of authority and its accountability, different modes of protest and political activity, of questioning the basic premises of the modern order and different modes of institutional formations.

These multiple patterns of modernity developed first in Europe, and gathered momentum with the expansion of modernity beyond Europe first to the Americas and later to Asian and African societies where development went beyond the initial model of Western society. Concomitantly, there developed in Western societies as well new discourses which transformed the initial model of modernity and undermined the original vision of modern and industrial society with its hegemonic and homogenizing vision. There emerged a tendency to distinguish between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität, and to recognize a multiplicity of Wertrationalitäten. Cognitive rationality – especially as epitomized in the extreme forms of scientism – has certainly been dethroned from its hegemonic position, as has also been the idea of the ‘conquest’ or mastery of the environment – whether of society or of nature.

**The different periods of modernity**

The basic contours of modernity have changed in different periods or stages of its development, which can be distinguished – even if somewhat schematically. One central stage is the period between the beginning of the 19th century up to the Cold War, a period characterized by the predominance of the nation, revolutionary states, of liberal and later more state-directed capitalism, and Western, mostly European, civilizational hegemony as well as by the expansion throughout the world of the ‘classical’ major modern social movements, especially socialism, communism and nationalism.

From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1960s, with the movements against the Vietnam War, the vision of modernity as manifest in the nation and revolutionary states attained its apogee, the full maturation of the original program of modernity. During this period, the nation and revolutionary states and the international systems and frameworks in which they played a central role constituted the major institutional arenas in which the program of modernity was being implemented and in which the tensions and antinomies of modernity were played out. In Western nation-states the growing participation of all citizens, including women, was attained in the political arenas, as was also the development of a new social economic program that culminated in new forms of regulated capitalism and of different types of welfare state. In this period, the major revolutionary states, the USSR and China, became more industrialized, developing parallels to the development of the capitalist countries. After the Second World War, although many authoritarian regimes persisted in Eastern and Southern Europe and in Latin America with new ones emerging in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, fascist and national socialist ideologies disappeared as an alternative modern ideology. Moreover, the authoritarian regimes in Europe and Latin America started to crumble in the 1960s and early 1970s. In this period of de-colonization, numerous new states were established in Asia and Africa. They largely followed two models – the ‘Western’ and the revolutionary (communist) ones. These new states were closely related to the hegemonic powers, the USA and the USSR, which continuously attempted to foster and control their respective satellite clients, even if, as was the case of many of the authoritarian regimes supported by the USA, their principles contradicted the ideologies of their patron states.

**The contemporary scene: beyond the hegemony of the nation and revolutionary state models**

From the 1960s to the early 20th century and beyond there appeared a new phase in the continuous reconstitution of modernity (Eisenstadt, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2006), entailing new institutional and ideological trends of globalization that challenge earlier modes of modernity.

The major characteristics of this change combine a transformation of the prevalent hegemonic institutional patterns and cultural premises of modern societies; the development of tendencies to democratization; intensive globalization; far-reaching changes in the international systems and shifts of hegemonies within them; and the development of
new patterns of inter-civilizational relations. All of these entail the crystallization of new patterns of multiple modernities beyond the classical models of the nation and the revolutionary states.

The common structural core of these processes has been the growing dissociation of social, economic, political, family and gender roles, organizations and relations from the hitherto macro formations, especially from the class relations characteristics of the nation-state along with a growing dissociation between political centers and major social and cultural collectivities and the development of multiple relatively autonomous networks and clusters which cut across many organizations and ‘societies’. Occupational, family, gender and residential roles have become dissociated from ‘Stand’, class, party-political, as well as existing territorial frameworks, tending to crystallize into continuously changing clusters. The former relatively rigid, homogeneous definition of life patterns became weaker and more porous.

Closely related were the reconstitution of the place of territoriality in the structuring of social roles and collective identities and a decoupling of the hitherto predominant relations between local and global frameworks (Sassen, 2006). There also developed a decomposition of the relatively compact image of the conceptions of ‘civilized man’ as embodied in the classical nation-state and in the concomitant life worlds of different social sectors and classes.

These developments crystallized within all the major institutional arenas of modern societies. In the economic arena there was a decline of the Keynesian Welfare State, with its combination of steady and reasonably rapid economic growth, near-full employment, rising real wages and standards of consumption, government intervention through monetary and fiscal policies, the development of welfare systems and some socialist experiments, and the domination of the American dollar. This model lost its hegemony with neo-liberal monetarist policies taking its place world-wide and epitomized in the Washington Consensus. Concomitantly, there crystallized patterns of globalization, entailing the increased migrations of labor and the disembedding of different occupational sectors from existing economic frameworks. This gave rise to new forms of transnational capitalism on the one hand together with different forms of Voodoo capitalism on the other (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999).

In the political arena throughout the world, the ‘third wave’ of democratization, reinforced by changes in technologies of communication and mass media, was characterized by demands of wider sectors for growing access to and participation in societal, transnational and local-political arenas. Concomitantly, there crystallized a paradoxical combination of the expansion of democratic ideology and institutions, seemingly the only acceptable game in the international arena; together with the weakening of many of the basic institutions of representative democracy and the strengthening of executive and judicial institutions. Political parties, some transformed into ‘cartel parties’, were weakened while populist tendencies and single-issue lobbying became stronger. There developed different patterns of ‘segmented’ sovereignty and multiple heterogeneous, internal as well as trans-state public spheres, and different patterns of distinct, non-electoral representatives of non-political democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008).

In line with the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, the weakening of the institutions of representative democracy has been connected with the growing de-ideologization of the conception of the political arena as embodying ideals of the original program of modernity. The political discourse increasingly focuses on ranges of de-ideologized issues – as against the emphasis on class relations, and on the possible transformation of the centers of the respective societies. New status struggles developed around the types of welfare benefits distributed by the State, with a focus on the attainment of entitlements. A politics of identity promulgated different types of group autonomy, and new spaces in which different ‘minorities’ – ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional – have attempted to disseminate their distinct identities in the media and in educational institutions, heightening issues in public discussion and political contestations.

At the same time a paradoxical situation developed in the internal political scenario of many societies all over the world. On the one hand, there developed in most societies a continual strengthening of the ‘technocratic’ ‘rational’ secular policies in various arenas, such as education, family planning and the like. But on the other hand, these policies could not cope adequately with most of the new problems attendant on the processes of globalization or with the potential destabilization of political frameworks and with the burgeoning politics of identity.

Concomitantly, contemporary transformations shifted from viewing the political centers or large-scale macro-societal units, as well as the technological-economic arenas, as the arenas of the implementation of charismatic social visions in the overall frameworks of modernity or modernities, attesting to the fact that modernity does not have a natural end-point. In the wake of a de-charismatization of social formations such as nations or states and
in the cultural domain of science, there developed new searches for manifestations of the charismatic in more dispersed and less central arenas, and a recognition of a multiplicity of ‘authentic’, often anominian forms of life and of social interaction.

Changes in international arenas

The full impact of the processes analyzed above can be understood only in the new historical context in which they have developed, the most important aspects of which have been shifts in the constitution of the international order; the development of new power relations between different states, shifts in the hegemonies thereof; as well as the emergence of new actors, institutions and new regulatory arenas and rules in the international arena, as well as new patterns of globalization. All of them attest to the disintegration of the ‘Westphalian’ international order and contributed to the development of a ‘New World Disorder’ (Jowitt, 1993). The development of disorder was intensified with the demise of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the bipolar relative stability of the ‘Cold War’, and of the salient ideological confrontation between communism and the West. With one superpower, the US, there developed greater autonomy within regional and trans-state frameworks as well as new combinations of geopolitical, cultural and ideological conflicts over the relations, standing and hegemony of the US and emerging global powers: the European Union, post-Soviet Russia and China.

In the second post-Soviet decade Russia, China and to a smaller extent India and Brazil became more independent players in the international economic order, pursuing independent policies, expressing their own geopolitical and economic interests, generating changes in the balance of regional geopolitical and economic formations, challenging the American hegemony, as well as the premises of the Washington Consensus. These challenges were propped up by significant changes in international economy – by the, even if temporary, semi-monopolistic standing of Russia in the realm of natural gas and by the growing economic strength of China and to some degree of India. These tendencies became intensified with the world-wide economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 which unsettled economic hegemons even further.

Concomitantly, the international financial agencies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund created after the Second World War, became prominent, often pursuing American interests and ideologies but also developing as relatively independent actors and regulators of the international economic trends which ultimately would challenge those interests. In addition, new international NGOs acted beyond the scope of any single nation-state and even beyond the more formal international agencies.

Prominent in the international scene were first of all important international agencies – the UN, regional agencies, above all those of the European Union. Second there was a plethora of new legal institutions such as the International Court and the European Constitutional Court, and multiple new international professional, legal, economic regulatory institutional networks.

Concomitantly, there developed new principles of legitimation undermining the premises of state sovereignty prevailing since the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Most important among these were principles of human rights transcending existing state boundaries and calling state agencies to accountability. Coalitions of different trans-state, as well as nation-state political actors with new social movements around these principles influenced the political dynamics of states, including the authoritarian ones. These developments have been presented by some actors as constituting arenas of a new international civil society which transcends existing political boundaries.

An important aspect of the new international scene was the development of a paradoxical situation with respect to the constitution of hegemony. On the one hand, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US remained the only superpower, in economic and military terms. But at the same time its hegemonic standing was challenged not only by opposition of states, movements and social sectors to policies that it promulgated unilaterally. But beyond this, it was often also challenged in the name of principles originated by the USA and adopted by the UN or the World Trade Organization. Thus there developed a new historical situation in which the hegemon lost the monopoly of its own legitimation of the new global order.

In this period there also emerged a new inter-civilizational ideological confrontation, manifest above all in the relations between Islam and the West, the turning point of which was the 9/11/ destruction of the Twin Towers in New York. This confrontation, which was often defined as attesting to a ‘clash of civilizations’, has become a constant component of the international order, often combining geopolitical and economic conflicts with religious-political ones recalling in many ways the Cold War situation – but without the relatively stabilizing effects of the bipolar system. Crucial to this confrontation was the intensification and diversification of many, especially, but not only Muslim terrorist groups which were not controlled by any single state. Having added to
the instability of the international system, these developments are further intensified by the inability of international actors and agencies to cope with many of the social problems attendant on the process of globalization.

Thus, in the national and international arenas there was a transfer of power to new centers of hegemony, to various global political institutions and organizations. This multiplication of dispersed centers of power, often connected with the new actors in the international scene, challenged the existing international order and hegemonic institutions.

**Contemporary globalization**

All these developments analyzed above have been closely related to, indeed interwoven with, the processes of contemporary globalization.

These new patterns of globalization have been closely related with the opening up of opportunities for women in lifestyle, marriage and motherhood; growing education and urban growth; the skewing of the population toward young age-groups, all of which allowed more effective expression of discontent. But on the other hand, there also developed new social problems on an international scale, among them rising divorce rates, prostitution, delinquency, epidemics (easily spread with environmental and climatology problems) and threats and instability attendant on nuclear proliferation, as well as all the dislocations analyzed above.

The most distinctive characteristics of the contemporary in comparison with ‘earlier’ globalizations have been not just the extent of the global flow of different resources and the development of new forms of global capital and economic formations, important as they have been. Indeed the global flows especially of economic resources that developed in this period were not necessarily greater than flows of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Rather, characteristics of contemporary globalization have been: first, the predominance of new forms of international capitalism, with the transition from industry to services along with the disembedding of segments of the workforce, especially those connected with the high-tech and financial activities – from existing economic organizations, now ‘denationalized’ or ‘deteriorialized’; second, the tendencies to the global economic neo-liberal hegemony promulgated among others by the major international agencies – the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organization – fully embodied in the Washington Consensus; third, extended international migrations and the dispossession of many social sectors – indeed of whole societies – from hitherto relatively stable economic and cultural niches; and fourth, the movement of hitherto peripheral societies and social sectors into the centers of the respective national and international systems.

Fifth, there have been growing discrepancies and inequalities among various central and peripheral sectors within and between societies. Of special importance in this context have been the combinations of discrepancies between social sectors which were incorporated into the hegemonic financial and ‘high-tech’ economic frameworks and those which were left out; the closely connected decline in the standard of living of the latter giving rise to acute feelings of dislocation and dispossession. Most visible among such dislocated or dispossessed groups were, first, groups from the middle or lower echelons of the more traditional sectors, hitherto embedded in relatively stable, even if not very affluent, social and economic and cultural frameworks, and now transferred into the lower echelons of new urban centers; and second, various highly mobile, ‘modern’ educated groups – professionals, graduates of modern universities and the like – who were denied autonomous access to and participation in the new political centers; and third, large social sectors which were eliminated from the workforce.

A far-reaching outcome of these processes was the economic and occupational polarization of many sectors, removed from the regular labor force and placed in insecure positions, marginalized as citizens and productive members of the community (Apter, 2008).

Many inequalities and dislocations that attended these processes of globalization coalesced with religious, ethnic or cultural divisions. They are especially visible in the Diasporas among the new religious, ethnic and national virtual communities, a very important new component of the international scene, and important part of new anti-globalization social movements, attesting to ‘the power of small numbers’ (Appadurai, 2006).

**New movements of protest**

One of the most important, indeed crucial, manifestations of the new constellation of modernity has been the crystallization of new types of social movements of protest – among them also the ‘anti-globalization’ ones – new constellations of which transformations have often been presented as the harbingers of far-reaching changes of the contemporary institutional and cultural scene, of the exhaustion of the entire program of modernity.

The various ‘anti-global’ movements have become closely interwoven with movements of the
mid-1960s, such as the ‘movements of 1968’, the ‘postmodern’, ‘post-materialist’ women’s movements, and ecological movements which started from the West and expanded throughout the world, entailing the radical transformation of orientations and themes of protest and the revolutionary *imaginaires*. Contrary to the basic orientations of the earlier, ‘classical’ social movements, which focused above all on the constitution and possible transformations of the socio-political center, of nation or state, or of the boundaries of major macro-collectivities, the new movements of protest were oriented to what one scholar has defined as the extension of the systemic range of social life and participation, manifest in demands for growing participation in work, different communal orientations, citizen movements and the like. In Habermas’ words these movements moved from focusing on problems of distribution to emphasis on a ‘grammar of life’ (Habermas, 1981: 33). Among sectors dispossessed by processes of globalization, there was a growing emphasis on exclusivist, particularist themes often formulated in highly aggressive terms (Eisenstadt, 2006: 185–220).

**Transformations of the model of the nation- and revolutionary-state: new patterns of collective identities**

All the processes analyzed above – of decoupling between different components of the social order, changes in the international arenas and contemporary globalization – have crystallized into new patterns of contemporary modernities entailing the transformation of the basic premises of nation- and revolutionary-state, giving rise to the crystallization of collective identities in political formations and in international relations.

All the developments analyzed above entailed transformations of the nation- and revolutionary-states which had been conceived as the epitome of the modern program. These transformations included a de-charismatization of the hitherto predominant models of nation- and revolutionary-state as well as of class-relations in the frameworks of these states. While the political centers of the nation- and revolutionary-states are still major agencies of resource distribution as well as strong actors in the major international arenas, many global (mostly financial) actors have become very powerful so that the control of the nation-state over its own economic and political affairs was reduced. The continuous strengthening of the ‘technocratic’ ‘rational’ secular policies in various arenas, as noted above, did not change the trend. The nation- and revolutionary-states also lost some of their – never total – monopoly of internal and international violence to many local and international groups of separatists or terrorists. No nation- or revolutionary-state, or groups of nation-states could control recurring violence. Above all, having been perceived as the major bearers of the cultural program of modernity, the basic frameworks of collective identity, and as the major regulators of the various secondary identities, the nation-states and the revolutionary-states became weakened and are no longer closely connected with a distinct cultural and civilizing program. Transformations of the premises of the nation-states entailed a reconstitution of the relations between territory, authority and rights (Sassen, 2006); the decoupling of the basic components of the classical nation-state – citizenship, patterns of entitlement, the constitution of public spaces and modes of political participation. In all states there develop different patterns of complex, indeed fragmented sovereignty (Grande and Pauly, 2005) reinforced by growing diversity of modes of representation.

Yet, while many of the nation-states continued to play an important role in the international arenas with some of them increasing their power (Mann, 1997), they were no longer the major rule-setters there or even in the internal political arenas of their respective elites. They competed with one another and with the new actors not only about their respective interests, but also about their ability to participate in setting up ground rules; and criteria for the legitimation of those rules.

Concomitantly, the boundaries of relatively closed collectivities and social arenas were weakened. Under the impact of intensive processes of globalization, nuclei of new cultural and social identities which transcend the existing political and cultural boundaries of the predominant nations and revolutionary ones crystallized and there developed new nuclei of cultural and social identities which transcended existing political and cultural boundaries. In many of these settings, local and transnational orientations were often brought together in new ways (Juergensmeyer, 2003).

Most important among the repercussions of these developments were redefinitions of boundaries of collectivities and of new ways of combining ‘local’ and global transnational or trans-state components in collectivities. Most hitherto ‘subdued’ identities – ethnic, local, regional and religious – have acquired a central role on the contemporary national and international public scenes and moved, as it were, into the centers of their respective societies and into the international arenas. They claim autonomy in central symbolic and institutional spaces, be it in educational programs, in public communications and media, and pose far-reaching claims for a redefinition of
citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it.

Many of these new types of collective identity were grounded, on the one hand, in smaller continually reconstituted 'local' settings; and on the other hand, in trans-state and national frameworks. In addition, there was a reconfiguration of the relation between primordial and/or sacred (religious) as against civil components in the constitution of collective identities entailing new modes of exclusion and inclusion. Closely related was the development within different social sectors of less ideologically homogeneous interpretations of national identity and of modernity, in terms different from those of the Enlightenment. Modernity was redefined in terms of distinct Greek or Turkish, Islamic, Indian or Chinese models (Faubion, 1993).

**Inter-civilizational settings: attempts at the re-appropriation of modernity**

The multiple changes analyzed above culminated in the crystallization of new inter-civilizational orientations and relations, which were perhaps most clearly manifest in the development of new types of movements, especially of global anti-globalization movements.

While inter-civilizational ‘anti-globalization’ or anti-hegemonic tendencies combined with an ambivalent attitude to the cosmopolitan centers of globalization developed in most historical cases of globalization (be it in the Hellenistic, Roman, the Chinese Confucian or Hindu, in ‘classical Islamic’, as well as early modern ones), yet on the contemporary scene they become transformed. First, through the media they spread throughout the world. Second, they entailed an ongoing reconstitution in a new global context, of collective identities and contestations between them. Third, they became highly politicized, interwoven with fierce contestations among them and the different hegemonic conflicts between political and ideological terms. Fourth, they gave rise to new inter-civilizational orientations. The central focus of these orientations were attempts to decouple modernity radically from Westernization, and to take the monopoly of modernity away from its origin in Western ‘Enlightenment’. They espoused new ‘civilizational’ visions, reformulated images and symbols of civilizational and religious identity – often formulated in terms of the universalistic premises of their respective religions or civilizations, grounded in their respective Axial religions, and attempted to transform the global scene in those terms. A central component of this discourse was a highly ambivalent attitude to the West, manifest in the expansion of strong world-wide anti-American movements.

The various ‘anti-global’ movements became closely interwoven with student movements, citizens’ movements, ecological, communal, religious and fundamentalist movements, which were the carriers of the transformed orientations and themes of protest and of the revolutionary imaginaire analyzed above. The crucial differences from the point of view of civilizational orientations between the major ‘classical’ national movements and the new contemporary communal, and religious (above all fundamentalist) movements, stand out with respect to their attitude to the West and to the premises of the cultural and political program of modernity. They constitute part of a set of much wider developments in Muslim, Indian and Buddhist societies, transforming the contestations between earlier reformist and traditional religious movements that developed in non-Western societies. Within these anti-global movements, confrontation with the West does not take the form of searching to become incorporated into the modern hegemonic civilization in its terms, but rather to appropriate the new international global scene and modernity in terms of their traditions. These movements adopt a markedly confrontational attitude to the West, and appropriate modernity and the global system, formulating the discourse of modernity in their own non-Western, often anti-Western, terms. This attitude to what is conceived as Western, is related to attempts to decouple modernity from Westernization and to do away with the Western monopoly on modernity. These developments differ from earlier reformist and traditional religious movements that developed throughout non-Western societies from the 19th century on.

They aim to take over the modern program in terms of their own civilizational premises, rooted, according to them, in the basic, universalistic premises of their respective religions or civilizations, thus attempting to transform the global scene in civilizational terms.

These visions are formulated in contestations couched in ‘civilizational’ terms which often endow them with absolutizing dimensions. At the same time, however, the vistas grounded in these traditions have been reconstituted under the impact of ‘modern’ programs. Indeed these discourses, including far-reaching criticisms of the predominant Enlightenment program of modernity, resemble in many ways the discourse of modernity as it developed in centers of European modernities. Thus for instance, many of the criticisms of the Enlightenment project as made by Qutub, possibly the most eminent fundamentalist theologian, are in...
many ways similar and often related to the major religious and 'secular' critics of Enlightenment from its very beginning, starting with de Maistre, the romantics; also many of the populist (Slavophiles and the like) in Central and Eastern Europe, not only in Russia, and in general those who have emphasized the expressivist dimension of human experience, then moving, of course, through Nietzsche to Heidegger (Taylor, 2007).

Such attempts at the reformulation of institutional premises have also been taking place in new institutional formations such as the European Union, in different local and regional frameworks, as well as in the various attempts by the different 'peripheries' – as for instance in the discourse on Asian values, to contest the Western, especially American, hegemony, as well as to forge their own constitutive modernities.

The debates and confrontations in which these actors engage and confront each other may be formulated in 'civilizational' terms, but these very terms as constructed in such a discourse, are couched in the language of modernity, in totalistic, essentialistic and absolutizing terms derived from the basic premises of the discourse of modernity, even if they often draw on older religious traditions. When such clashes are combined with political, military or economic struggles and conflicts, they can indeed become very violent. They may give rise, in contrast to the symmetric wars between nation-states framed by the Westphalian order, to non-symmetric wars which became a continual component of the international order (Münkler, 2003). Of special importance was the multiplication and intensification of aggressive terrorist movements and inter-civilizational contestations and encounters, which became a seemingly permanent component of the new international inter-civilizational scene.

Annotated further reading


One of the most incisive critical examinations of the dislocations engendered by contemporary globalization.


The analysis of the religious sectarian origins of modernity and the continuity of sectarianism and of Jacobin, fundamentalist components in modernity.


The core statement of the program of multiple modernities emphasizing both the common core of modernity as a distinct civilization and the great variability thereof in different societies throughout the world. The different articles in this volume analyze several distinct cases of modernity.


A very insightful analysis of the transformation of national collective identities in contemporary societies under the impact of globalization.


A systematic analysis of the transformation of patterns of sovereignty in contemporary societies.


An incisive analysis of the distinct characteristics of the new social movements with emphasis on grammar of life as compared with classical social and cultural movements.


Possibly the most forceful research of the view of modernity as a progressive and emancipatory movement.


One of the most systematic and forceful analyses of the distinct characteristics of modern ‘open’ penalty based on intensive research in several countries and sectors with special emphasis on the impact of industrialization in the development of these characteristics.


A collection of brilliant essays by the leading Polish philosopher emphasizing the internal tensions and contradictions of modernity. In contrast to the progressive optimistic view of modernity, it presents modernity as being continually challenged by its implementation in different settings – being indeed on endless trial.


A forceful statement on the core characteristics of modernity as a distinct cultural and political program – mainly the loss of markers of certainty it entails.

Lerner D (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

A classical statement based on interviews in Turkey. The book highlights the differences between traditional and modern societies or sectors thereof, emphasizing the ‘closure’ of the former and the openness of the latter, especially in terms of their acceptance of new visions and premises and of personal relations.
A sharp analysis of the different metacultures of modernity with their implications for the dynamic tensions and antinomies thereof.

A comprehensive analysis of the core tensions of modernity – mainly that between liberty and development as they evolved in different modern contexts.

Wittrock B (2002) Modernity: one, none or many?
A discussion of the problematic of multiple modernities, of the relations between the original European modernity and its expansion and transformation throughout the world, emphasizing the problematic of the very existence of a global modern civilization and its major characteristics.

References


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résumé Cet article analyse les principales caractéristiques de la modernité, de la civilisation moderne. Il considère pour cela les principales approches analytiques qui sont liées à des structures sociales et aux états contemporains. La notion de modernité multiple sera au cœur de cette analyse. Selon cette idée, le meilleur moyen de comprendre le monde contemporain est de considérer la modernité comme l’histoire de continus développements, formations, constitutions et reconstitutions de modernités multiples, changeantes, et souvent contestées et conflictuelles.

mots-clés développement ◆ globalisation ◆ modernisation ◆ modernité

resumen Este artículo analiza las principales características de la modernidad, de la civilización moderna; los principales métodos analíticos vinculados con las grandes estructuras sociales y el estado contemporáneo. El núcleo de este análisis es la noción de modernidades múltiples. Esta idea plantea que la mejor manera de entender el mundo contemporáneo es considerar la modernidad como una historia de la formación, la constitución, la reconstitución y el desarrollo permanente de múltiples, cambiantes y, a menudo, contestadas y conflictivas modernidades.

palabras clave desarrollo ◆ globalización ◆ modernidad ◆ modernización